Buying Decision Coordination and Monopoly Pricing of Network Goods by Sääskilahti, Pekka
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Buying Decision Coordination and
Monopoly Pricing of Network Goods
Pekka Sa¨a¨skilahti
27. March 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5106/
MPRA Paper No. 5106, posted 2. October 2007
Buying Decision Coordination and Monopoly
Pricing of Network Goods
Pekka Sääskilahti
Nokia Corporation
Nokia Corporation, P.O. Box 321, 00045 Nokia Group
Tel. +358 50 4872487
E-mail: saaskilahti@yahoo.com (or pekka.saaskilahti@nokia.com)
27.3.2006
Abstract
We analyse how consumer heterogeneity a¤ects buying behaviour
and the monopoly pricing of a network good and its usage. Under per-
fect information, su¢ ciently high heterogeneity yields a unique equilib-
rium, and the unit price is increasing in heterogeneity. Under incom-
plete information, we have a global game. The unit price is independent
of heterogeneity, and it tends to be higher than the perfect information
price, because the monopoly biases its tari¤ structure to incorporate
the uncertainty over usage revenues. Under incomplete information,
prots are decreasing in uncertainty. Consumer surplus increases in
uncertainty, only if the level of uncertainty is high initially.
Keywords: Coordination, network externalities, heterogeneity, in-
formation, equilibrium uniqueness, global games.
JEL classication: D42, D82, L14.
1 Introduction
The product has a social dimension when its usage involves interaction be-
tween consumers. This is captured as network externalities. Because the
consumers utility from a social good depends on how many other consumers
buy the good, expectations on other consumersactions determine whether
the consumer actually buys the good or not. Heterogeneity between con-
sumer types may facilitate coordination, but under incomplete information
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it translates to uncertainty over other peoples actions. In this paper, we
analyse how expectations and uncertainty about buying decisions among
consumers a¤ects consumersstrategies and a monopolists pricing strategy.
It is a well-known fact that network externalities cause multiple equilib-
ria, because they induce a coordination game with strategic action comple-
mentarities à la Bulow et al. (1985). Indeterminacy caused by multiplicity
of equilibria has been incorporated in the theory in the forms of de facto
standards and bandwagon strategy proles by the seminal papers by Arthur
(1989), David (1985), Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986), who study technol-
ogy adoption, and Katz and Shapiro (1985) who examine brand competition
and compatibility between networks. Those papers and subsequent litera-
ture accepting indeterminacy as a characteristic of economic networks, sug-
gest that market structures in network industries are determined by random
exogenous events. Multiplicity causes agentsstrategies to be equilibrium-
specic, hence in order to derive the optimal actions, the analysis must focus
on one equilibrium at a time. Since the arguments that select the equilib-
rium are inevitably exogenous to the model, we do not learn much on the
agentsbehaviour at the end. This underlines the benets from reaching a
unique equilibrium, as the results become determinate.
Herrendorf et al. (2000) have shown that a coordination game with
strategic action complementarities can have a unique equilibrium under per-
fect information, if consumer types are su¢ ciently dispersed. Under incom-
plete information, uniqueness presupposes a possibility of su¢ cient hetero-
geneity (Carlsson and van Damme 1993, Morris and Shin 2003, Mason and
Valentinyi 2003). We leverage the recent theory to obtain a unique equi-
librium in a network model. We show that the solutions and results under
perfect and incomplete information di¤er. The requirement for uniqueness
under perfect information implies that consumers make their buying deci-
sions dominantly on non-network-specic attributes, and endogenous pricing
is an insu¢ cient mean to eliminate multiplicity. For a model of network ef-
fects this constraint is troublesome. Under incomplete information, unique-
ness can be reached even if network attributes are driving decision making.
The assumption about incomplete information is also supported by the ob-
servation that, with a launch of a new device, people are not usually able to
tell how much utility the device yields to other people. This informational
asymmetry is aggravated the more drastic innovation the new device is.
We o¤er two real world examples. The rst example is online gam-
ing. Sony PlayStation, Microsoft Xbox and Nokia N-Gage consoles all have
standalone and interaction usage features. Players can play alone or against
other players on the same console. In addition, console manufacturers run
platforms1 that o¤er services and content, and allow people to play and talk
with other people over the Internet. It is also usual that people swap games
1Sony Central Station and Xbox Live. N-Gage allows playing over the air directly.
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with their friends. A consumer who considers buying a console, takes into
account how many games a particular console has in supply and what is the
quality of the console. Another point he bears in mind is whether his friends
have the same brand so that he can play with, and against them.
The second example is mobile telecommunications. Mobile phones can
be also used nowadays for checking latest news and e-mails, or to listen
to the radio and music, and even to watch television. These features create
intrinsic value for a phone. The main value driver, of course, is the possibility
to talk with friends and send them messages.
We model a market consisting of consumers and a monopoly rm. The
rm sells a novel device that constitutes an e¢ cient medium for interaction.
Like with many network goods, the total utility from the good consists of
usage utility from interaction with other people, and of intrinsic utility from
standalone services used independently of other consumers.2 Everybody
agrees that all pre-innovation interaction can be mediated by the new de-
vice, and the quality of interaction is improved so that the product generates
positive network externalities. Since interaction can take place only after
people have acquired the goods, we separate the usage stage from the ac-
quisition stage. The monopolist sets a two-part tari¤ for the product and
its usage, and is not able to commit to a tari¤ structure in the rst stage.
We analyse two informational cases. We rst assume that all informa-
tion is perfect. Heterogeneity between consumers is directly observed, and
achievable network benets are perfectly taken into account in the buying
decisions. Under incomplete information, consumer heterogeneity induces
uncertainty about buying decisions, and consumers must take expectations
about achievable network benets.
We assume that consumers are homogeneous with respect to interaction
utility, whereas the consumer types are horizontally di¤erentiated according
to their perception of the intrinsic value à la Hotelling (1929). Under incom-
plete information, consumers derive their types through noisy signals of the
intrinsic value. Di¤erentiation captures the idea of consumer satisfaction
with products technical performance.3
2 Intrinsic utility may include status-enhancing type of utility, and any non-direct ben-
ets from belonging to a network including higher-order interaction benets, which com-
prise utility from interaction taking place between ones friendsfriends, between friends
friendsfriends, and so forth.
3Why is intrinsic utility subjected to di¤erentiation while usage is not? Usage utility is
directly associated with the people who interact, or more precisely, with the social relation
the interacting parties have. The device is a mere medium, which does not inuence the
value of the social relation. We assume that each consumer has equally valuable social
relations and the improvement in interaction e¢ ciency is identical for all. In contrast, how
di¤erent consumers perceive the novel features of the device, the capacity to use it, and the
attitude towards new technology di¤er between people. Intrinsic utility does not even have
to be positive in relation to older generation products. As an example, "mobility" is the
principal improvement of mobile telecommunications with respect to xed line telephony.
Being able to call and to be called independent of time and place is an objectively measured
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We derive the optimal two-part tari¤ structure for the monopoly, and
analyse the e¤ects of a marginal change in consumer heterogeneity. The
optimal unit price is increasing in heterogeneity under perfect information.
If information is incomplete, the price is independent of heterogeneity. The
monopolist sets a higher unit price, compared to the price under perfect
information, in the rst period in order to incorporate the possibility of
a wide perception of a low quality of its goods and subsequent low usage
prots. There is no such bias under perfect information, as the monopolist
is able to perfectly capture the usage utility. We also discuss the possibility
that the second period is characterised by perfect competition. In that case,
the bias for a higher rst period price is aggravated.
The e¤ect of a marginal change in heterogeneity on prots and consumer
surplus is ambiguous under perfect information, but the rms expected
prots increase as uncertainty (heterogeneity) is reduced under incomplete
information. The e¤ect of a marginal change in uncertainty on expected
consumer surplus is positive, if the change is aligned with the absolute level.
That is, if uncertainty is high in the rst place, then further uncertainty is
of good. Similarly, the expected consumer surplus increases, when there is
little uncertainty and we further reduce it.
Most of the related network externalities literature is concerned with
the question about socially optimal standardisation. Shy (2001) and Baake
and Boom (2001) nd that the intensity of price competition is reduced
with compatible networks compared to incompatible networks. Bental and
Spiegel (1995) derive that the largest network is also the most expensive one,
if peoples willingness to pay increases in the size of the network. Cabral
et al. (1999) and Mason (2000) prove that the Coase conjecture fails in
its strongest form with durable goods inducing network externalities. Our
model is also related to the telecommunications network competition liter-
ature set out by Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont et al. (1998a, 1998b).
Our model is an application of the global games theory that has been
successfully applied in a number of macroeconomic and nancial problems.
Morris and Shin (1998) and Heinemann et al. (2004) analyse a model of
speculative currency attacks. Englmaier and Reisinger (2003) apply global
games to an economic development framework. Morris and Shin (2004) and
Rochet and Vives (2004) study solvent but illiquid nancial institutions.
Myatt and Wallace (2002) analyse public goods provision with global games
techniques. Chwe (1998) nds that goods with social externalities advertise
improvement (you can always keep the phone switched o¤ whenever you wish!) However,
mobile phones tend to be small in size and their use can therefore be very di¢ cult for
example, for elderly people. The size factor is positive for most consumers, but it can
also be negative. Alternatively, some people believe that mobile phones emit radiation
harmful to the brain. Other people fear that third parties can secretly monitor the user.
Whether it is due to the fear of brain tumors or malicious surveillance, some people may
be reluctant to carry a mobile phone, even if they get one for free.
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"more on more expensive popular [TV] shows because viewers of popular
shows know that many other people are also watching" supporting global
games predictions. Our paper, together with Argenziano (2004), are the rst
applications of global games to network economics. These models are also
the rst to endogenise the payo¤s with a pricing problem. Argenziano (2004)
studies a platform competition with pure membership externalities. Our
model di¤ers from her model in that we study a market with membership and
usage decisions. In addition, we analyse a monopolist that sets a two-part
tari¤, whereas Argenziano (2004) analyses a Bertrand duopoly with linear
prices. She shows that network sizes are socially too balanced. Endogenous
strategic pricing aggravates the social ine¢ ciency, as the rm with higher
expected quality sets the highest price.
In section 2, we explain the model structure. In section 3, we link net-
work externalities to interaction on a network of social relations. We analyse
the benchmark case of perfect information in section 4. In section 5, we
analyse the incomplete information case. The results from the two informa-
tion regimes are compared in section 6. We conclude in section 7.
2 Players, actions, and timing
There is a continuum I = 1 of consumers in the market. The fundamen-
tal intrinsic value of the product  is drawn from a uniform distribution
F () : Consumer types x are i.i.d. around the fundamental according to a
conditional uniform distribution G (x j ) :
Timing is summarised in Figure (1). The rst period problem for con-
sumer i 2 I is to choose action ai 2 fB;Ng ; where B = buy the device and
N = do not buy. If the consumer bought the device, then he needs to decide
how much he uses it in the second period. Those consumers, who did not
buy, collect the reservation utility of zero and make no further decisions.
The rm sets a unit price in the rst period, and in the second period, it
charges a usage fee. The unit cost for manufacturing one device is cf , and
the rm incurs a unit cost ca 2 [0; 1] for interaction mediation. Fixed costs
are zero. We assume no discounting. The purchase of the device is a sunk
cost to consumers, but it enables subsequent interaction usage. The rm is
not able to commit to a tari¤ structure in the rst period, thus it sets the
usage charge after the consumers have made their purchasing decisions.
The new device can be used in interaction only if both parties have
bought the device. For example, let consumer i have a need to interact with
j: If both i and j have bought the device, then they use it. If either one
does not have the product, then they use conventional ways to interact. We
assume an exogenous social network structure, so that from consumer is
point of view, interaction with j is not the same as interaction with k; and
the social relations are unequal in terms of interaction utility. Consequently,
5
FIRST PERIOD SECOND PERIOD
Firm sets usage fee t.
Consumers choose the
level of usage.
Perfect information:
S and consumer types x are
revealed to all. Firm sets unit
price p. Consumers choose
whether to buy or not.
Imperfect information:
Consumers learn their private
types x. Firm sets unit price p.
Consumers choose whether
to buy or not.
Perfect information:
Actions are revealed.
Imperfect information:
Actions and the realisation
of S and types x are revealed.
Figure 1: Time Line.
inability to interact with j cannot be compensated by interaction with k:
We assume that each consumer is interested in interacting with the whole
population, so a consumer decides how large a fraction of the population he
wants to interact for a given price.4 Only the person paying for the usage
gets utility. "Reception" is cost-less and yields zero utility. In a given social
relation, both consumers may pay for usage and get utility. Since the under-
lying social network is exogenous, the interaction needs are independent of
who buys the device. As a result, the consumers are symmetric with respect
to usage demand in the second period.
The second period is deterministic. In the rst period, the model is
exposed to two informational regimes. First, information is perfect to all.
Second, information is incomplete, so that consumers observe noisy signals
of  which correspond to consumer types. The realisations of the signals
are private information, but the prior F () and the posterior G (x j ) are
common knowledge. The rm observes nothing and resorts to the prior.
Such informational asymmetry follows from an assumption that consumers
know their needs better than the rm.
The expected net utility of the consumer of type x from buying (a = B) ;
when he expects a fraction q of the population to buy, is
u (x; q;B) = x+  (; t; q)  p;
where p is the unit price. The intrinsic value is given by x; and the network
benets from e¢ cient communication is given by  (; t; q) that is increasing
in q:  is the fraction of population the consumer interacts with, and t is
the usage fee per social relation. If x   p > 0; then a = B is a strictly
4 In Sääskilahti (2005a p.78-82), we analyse a version of the model where each con-
sumer is interested in interaction with only a sub-set of total population. We show that
the "global" and "local" interaction models coincide when all consumers have the same
number of contacts, inducing network symmetry. See Sääskilahti (2005b) for an analysis
on asymmetric social relations.
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dominating strategy. Action N is a strictly dominating strategy when x +
 (; t; q = 1) p < 0 for all (; t) : Action B is the best response, if the usage
utility is higher than the price net of intrinsic utility,  (; t; q) > p  x:5
3 Second period
Let i 2 [0; 1] be the marginal person consumer i wants to interact with for
a given usage price. i = 1 means that i wants to interact with the whole
population. The exogenous social network guarantees i =  for all i 2 I:
We sacrice some generality and assume that the marginal utility is linear,
but any function with decreasing marginal utility yields qualitatively the
same results. If the fraction q 2 [0; 1] of consumers has played a = B in
the rst period, then by the law of large numbers, q is also the probability
that a particular person has bought the product. The net marginal utility
from interaction with the social contact indexed  is @(;t;q)@ = q (1    t),
which yields the expected net usage utility
 (; t; q) = q

  1
2
2   t

:
Because only the proportion q of the population has bought the product,
the consumer cannot use it with more people. Hence, the consumers second
period objective is
max

f (; t; q)g ; s.t.  2 [0; q] :
The optimal level of usage is
 (t; q) = min f1  t; qg : (1)
The rms second period problem is to maximise usage prots 2 =
q (t; q) (t  ca) by setting the usage fee t, where the per consumer demand
is given by equation (1).
The rm always charges a usage fee such that the consumers are main-
tained at the elastic part of the demand. To see this, assume that consumers
are constrained in their usage, i.e. 1  t > q: Then, the rm could increase
its fee up till point t = 1   q without triggering a decrease in demand. By
a similar argument, the rm charges a fee less than one. As a result we can
write the rms second period problem as
max
t
fq (t; q) (t  ca)g ; s.t. t 2 [1  q; 1[ :
5The payo¤ function is in line with the utility specication of Katz and Shapiro (1985),
where consumers are di¤erentiated in terms of intrinsic utility, and utility depending on
the network size is the same for all buyers. De Palma and Leruth (1996) analyse the polar
case, where buyers have di¤erent valuations for the network benets.
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The optimal usage fee is
t = max

1
2
(1 + ca) ; 1  q

; (2)
with the interior solution t = 12 (1 + ca) satisfying second order conditions,
@22
@t2
=  2q < 0: When the optimal usage fee (2) is plugged back into the
second period prots, we get
2 (ca; q) =

q2 (ca) ; q  12 (1  ca)
q2 (ca; q) ; q <
1
2 (1  ca)
;
where 2 (ca) =
1
4 (1  ca)2 and 2 (ca; q) = q (1  ca   q) : Double star
indicates that the monopolist is at the interior solution and single star that
the monopolist is at the corner solution, where it is capacity constrained.
Naturally, we have 2 (ca)  2 (ca; q) :
Because the rm keeps consumers at the elastic part of the demand,
 (t; q) = 1   t and  ( (t; q) ; t; q) = 12q (1  t)2 hold. Substituting
the fee (2) in the expected indirect usage utility, we get
 (q) =

1
8q (1  ca)2 ; if q  12 (1  ca)
1
2q
3; if q < 12 (1  ca)
:
4 First period with perfect information
4.1 Equilibrium
The fundamental intrinsic utility  is drawn from the uniform distribution
F () over the support [ M;M ] :When  is the realisation, consumers obtain
i.i.d. private values x according to the conditional uniform distribution
G (x j ) over [   ;  + ] : All types x and the fundamental  are perfectly
observed by the consumers and the rm at the beginning of the rst period.
With zero reservation utility, the payo¤ gain from a = B versus a = N is
v (x; q; p) = x+  (q)  p: (3)
Denote by   the coordination game of perfect information with I = 1
consumers, pure actions a 2 fB;Ng ; payo¤ (3) ; and parameterised by price
p. The payo¤ function (3) is continuous in its arguments, even at the cut-o¤
point q = 12 (1  ca) where  (q) changes its shape. It is also di¤erentiable,
except at q = 12 (1  ca) : The payo¤presents strictly increasing di¤erences in
x: Actions are strategic complements, because the payo¤ gain (3) is strictly
higher when a larger proportion of population choose a = B. Since the
action set a 2 fB;Ng is a compact subset of R; the complementarity and
continuity properties of (3) imply that   is supermodular (see e.g. Vives
2001 ch.2). Supermodularity guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium
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(NE) with a smallest and a largest element unless it is unique. Because
the actions are strategic complements, the maximal equilibrium element is
Pareto dominating.
When the consumer expects proportion E (q) = qe of people to play B;
he is indi¤erent between buying and not when his type is
x (qe; p) = p   (qe) : (4)
The corresponding demand schedule is
q (p; qe) =
8<:
0; if x (qe; p) >  + 
1 G (x (qe; p) j ) ; if      x (qe; p)   + 
1; if x (qe; p) <    :
(5)
The marginal type dened by (4) is unique for a given pair (qe; p) ; be-
cause the payo¤ (3) is continuous and strictly increasing in x: More "opti-
mistic" expectations reduce the marginal type, @x(q
e;p)
@qe < 0: This captures
the correspondence between e¢ cient coordination and the Pareto-dominant
maximal NE. Expectations on the number of consumers who buy are fullled
in the equilibrium, qei = q for all i 2 I; but with multiplicity of equilibria it
is undetermined on which level of q expectations converge.
Lemma 1 The action prole a (x) is a Nash equilibrium of   if
a (x) = B, if x  x (q; p)
a (x) = N , if x < x (q; p) ;
with fullled expectations Ei (q) = q; and x (q; p) = p   (q) for all i 2 I:
We allow negative unit prices, but we rule out, throughout our analysis,
prohibitively negative states  and prohibitively high production costs cf ;
in order to exclude cases where the rm chooses to remain inactive.6
We have to distinguish between two cases: (i) (relatively) high net-
work externalities and (ii) low network externalities. Network externalities
are high, if they dominate the posterior distribution G (x j ) in the sense
v (   ; q = 1; p) > v ( + ; q = 0; p) ,  < 116 (1  ca)2 : When network
externalities are high, the price p =     + 18 (1  ca)2 ; which leaves the
lowest type indi¤erent between actions, when everybody else buys, exceeds
the highest types intrinsic valuation  +   p < 0:
6Let p (; cf ) and q (; cf ) be the optimal price and quantity respectively for state 
and costs cf . A prohibiting state-cost pair

 ; c+f

; for which rst period losses outweigh
second period prots, is dened implicitly by
0  2
 
ca; q
   ; c+f  < c+f   p   ; c+f  , if q   ; c+f  < 12 (1  ca)
0  2 (ca) < c+f   p
 
 ; c+f

, if q
 
 ; c+f
  1
2
(1  ca)
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Denition 2 Network externalities are high (low) relative to intrinsic value
when  <(>)
1
16 (1  ca)2 :
The optimal monopoly price is dened as p = argmax f(p)g ; where
(p) =

q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)2 (ca) ; if q (p)  12 (1  ca)
q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)2 (ca; q (p)) ; if q (p) < 12 (1  ca)
: (6)
Endogenous pricing turns out to be an insu¢ cient remedy to the multiplicity
of equilibria problem. If network externalities are high, we have always
multiple equilibria in the coordination game  ; and the rm cannot inuence
the equilibrium selection. On the other hand, low network externalities mean
that the consumer distribution G (x j ) is su¢ ciently dispersed, so that the
price can induce the consumers to play both actions as strictly dominating
strategies simultaneously, ruling out the multiplicity of equilibria.
Lemma 3 With endogenous pricing, a unique equilibrium is feasible only
with low network externalities.
Proof. In the appendix.
Lemma 3 indicates that uniqueness relates to the driver in consumers
decision making. If the product is mainly used for interaction purposes, there
emerges multiplicity of equilibria and demand is indeterminate. Opposing, if
the product is mainly used standalone, with interaction usage being merely
a complementary feature, there is a unique equilibrium.
We close this section by characterising the optimal unit price under low
network externalities in cases where the equilibrium is unique. We need to
distinguish between various possible states of ; so that there are two cases
to consider: (i) q (p)  12 (1  ca), and (ii) q (p) < 12 (1  ca).
(i) Assume rst that q (p) 2 12 (1  ca) ; 1 holds in the second period.
We get demand from equation (5) by setting qe = q;
q =
 +   p
2  18 (1  ca)2
: (7)
The term  18 (1  ca)2 captures the second period usage utility.
The di¤erentiation of the monopolys prots (6) with respect to p gives
the optimal unit price detailed in Proposition 4.7
Proposition 4 The optimal unit price under low network externalities and
q (p) 2 12 (1  ca) ; 1 is
p =
1
2
( + + cf   2 ) : (8)
7The second order condition is satised due to our assumption on low network exter-
nalities, @
2(p)
@p2
=   1
  1
16
(1 ca)2 < 0:
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Proof. Obtained directly by di¤erentiating (p) = q (p) (p  cf )+q (p)2 (ca) ;
where q (p) is given by equation (7) ; with respect to p:
(ii) Assume next that q (p) 2 0; 12 (1  ca) holds in the second period
and that p (q) =  +    q  2  12q2 >     + 18 (1  ca)2. It is more
convenient to solve for the indirect demand p (q) from equation (5) ; where
qe = q holds in equilibrium, and let the rm choose optimal quantity q.
Proposition 5 The optimal quantity under low network externalities and
q (p) 2 0; 12 (1  ca) is given by the rst order condition8
2q3   3q2   2 [2  (1  ca)] q +  +   cf = 0: (9)
Proof. Obtained directly by di¤erentiating (q) = q (p (q)  cf )+q2 (ca; q) ;
where p (q) =  +   q  2  12q2 ; with respect to q:
4.2 Comparative statics
We discuss here the characteristics of the equilibrium in the cases where it is
unique. Assume rst q (p)  12 (1  ca) : The optimal unit price is given by
equation (8) : From demand (7), we see that in this case the state must be
bounded from below   cf     14 (1  ca)2 + 2 (1  ca)
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i
:
The monopoly increases the unit price as heterogeneity increases in order to
capture a higher share of surplus from the high consumer types.
Proposition 6 The optimal unit price is increasing in the heterogeneity of
consumers, if the fundamental intrinsic value is high   cf   14 (1  ca)2+
2 (1  ca)
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i
:
Proof. Di¤erentiation of the equation (8) gives @p

@ =
1
2 :
When the optimal price is plugged back into (7) ; we get
q =
 +   cf + 14 (1  ca)2
4
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i : (10)
The di¤erentiation of (10) with respect to  gives
@q
@
>
(<)
0,  <
(>)
cf   5
16
(1  ca)2 :
The above rule denes a minimum state above which demand is decreas-
ing in consumer heterogeneity. Since higher values of  are associated with
both higher demand and higher price elasticity, the marginal decrease in
demand with respect to  is larger for higher values of .
8The second order condition requires 3q (q   1) < 2  (1  ca) :
11
When an increase in heterogeneity increases demand, the higher demand
in turn increases the value of the good inducing a positive reinforcement
e¤ect on demand. Because the rm compensates this by increasing the price,
we obtain the mixed result that for low values of  demand increases, and for
high values of ; it decreases with marginal changes in : A marginal increase
in  has a stronger e¤ect on demand the less heterogeneous consumers are
(that is the closer  is to 116 (1  ca)2), because in that case the network
externalities are more important and drive conformity in buying decisions.
Prots are
(p; t) =
h
 +   cf + 14 (1  ca)2
i2
8
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i :
Consumer surplus is
S =
1
2
Z +
x=x(q(p);p)

x+
1
8
(1  ca)2 q (p)  p

dx
=
8<: +   cf + 14 (1  ca)24 h  116 (1  ca)2i
9=;
2
:
A marginal change in  has an ambiguous e¤ect on prots and consumer
surplus. There is a tendency for them to move in the same direction for
marginal changes in : Prots increase when @p

@ and
@q(p)
@ are both positive,
obviously. In the cases where demand decreases as  increases, prots tend
to decrease when  is close to its minimum, as network externalities cause a
stronger demand e¤ect, and prots tend to increase when  is large.
Assume next that the value of  is relatively low enough compared to
production costs so that the rm is constrained in the second period, q (p) <
1
2 (1  ca) : The resulting optimal price p (q) and the second period usage
fee t are higher in this case due to lower demand in the rst period.
Proposition 7 Demand is increasing (decreasing) in consumer heterogene-
ity, if the equilibrium demand is relatively low (high) and constrains the
second period usage.
Proof. Totally di¤erentiating the rst order condition (9) gives
dq
d
> 0, q < min

1
4
;
1
2
(1  ca)

dq
d
< 0, 1
4
< q <
1
2
(1  ca) :
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As a result, a positive marginal change in  causes similar e¤ects on
demand, as in the case where the rm is not constrained in the second
period. The monopoly compensates the broader type distribution and the
increase in the value of usage utility (the reinforced demand e¤ect) with a
higher unit price. Comparative statics for prots and consumer surplus are
computatively more complicated but present analogous tendencies.
5 First period with incomplete information
With incomplete information, the game remains otherwise unchanged, ex-
cept that consumers and the monopolist do not observe directly  until at
the end of period one. Consumersrst period observations of  are blurred
by noise, whereas the rm resorts to the prior in its rst period estimates.
The consumers know that the rm is uninformed, which removes all possible
information about  that might otherwise be inferred from prices (p; t) :
The value of  is drawn from the uniform distribution F () with support
[ M;M ]. The consumers draw i.i.d. signals x from the uniform conditional
distribution G (x j ) with the support [   ;  + ] : The consumer who ob-
serves signal x gets an expected payo¤ gain (3) from action a = B versus
a = N; identical to the payo¤ gain under perfect information. Now, un-
certainty over  corresponds to horizontal di¤erentiation, similarly to the
perfect information case, and the rst period game is a global game with
private values. The payo¤ (3) is continuous and increasing in (x; q). In
addition, it satises the "strict Laplacian state monotonicity" condition
(see Morris and Shin 2003). Namely, there exists a unique ex that solvesR 1
q=0 v (ex; q; p) dq = 0.9 In sum, the payo¤ (3) satises all the conditions
on strategic complementarities and continuity that global games require for
equilibrium uniqueness. The remaining condition we need to impose is on
the dominance regions. For all expectations, some consumers must play
a = B as a strictly dominating strategy at the same time as another group
plays a = N as a strictly dominating strategy. Because the support of
the prior is bounded and price is chosen endogenously, the existence of the
dominance regions is not trivially satised.
Condition 8 Dominance regions of strictly dominating strategies exist if
M > max

cf   1
8
(1  ca)2   2; 1
3
cf +
1
6
(1  ca)2   2
3


:
Proof. In the appendix.
9Dene z (x) =
R 1
q=0
v (x; q; p) dq: Integration gives z (x) = x   p +
1
128
(1  ca)2

8  (1  ca)2

where 1
128
(1  ca)2

8  (1  ca)2
  0: Hence, @z(x)
@x
> 0 for
all x; and there exists a unique ex that solves z (ex) = 0: If p >
(<)
1
128
(1  ca)2

8  (1  ca)2

,
then ex is positive (negative).
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Condition 8 requires the prior to be su¢ ciently uninformative. WhenM
is su¢ ciently large, the heterogeneity  can a¤ord to go to zero at the limit.
Denote by  II the incomplete information game parameterised by price
p with I = 1 consumers, pure actions a 2 fB;Ng ; payo¤ (3), where  is
distributed according to F (), signals are i.i.d. according to G (x j ), and
where the distributions satisfy Condition 8. The game  II is supermodular,
and the global games theory predicts that it has a unique Bayesian switching
equilibrium solvable by the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Lemma 9 The game  II has a unique switching strategy equilibrium  II
that survives the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies
a (x) = N; if x < ex
a (x) = B, if x > ex;
where ex is the unique solution to R 1q=0 v (ex; q; p) dq = 0.
Proof. The proof follows straightforwardly from the proof of Proposition 2.1
in Morris and Shin (2003).10
We obtain from Lemma 9 that the consumers expectations about the
fraction of people who play a = B follows a uniform distribution on the unit
interval. Hence, the marginal signal ex; which acts as the cut-o¤ rule in the
consumersequilibrium strategy, is given byZ 1
2
(1 ca)
q=0
ex+ 1
2
q3   p

dq +
Z 1
q= 1
2
(1 ca)
ex+ 1
8
(1  ca)2 q   p

dq = 0;
where we have taken into account the cut-o¤ point q = 12 (1  ca) ; at which
the rm reaches the interior optimal usage fee. Integration gives
ex = p+  (ca) ;
where  (ca) = 1128 (1  ca)2
h
(1  ca)2   8
i
captures the consumersexpec-
tations on second period usage utility. When  is the realisation of the
fundamental, the proportion of consumers who get signals higher than ex is
q = 1 G (ex j ) ; giving the rst period demand
q (; p) =
8<:
1; if  > ex+ 
+ (ca) p
2 ; if ex      ex+ 
0; if  < ex  : (11)
Having dened the demand, we can turn to the pricing problem. Dene
a cut-o¤ state b as q b; p = 12 (1  ca) : Whenever the true state is higher
10The proof to Lemma 9 is detailed in Sääskilahti (2005a pp. 73-76) as the "Proof to
Proposition 4".
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than b; the rm is not constrained in the second period. Firms rst period
problem is to choose unit price p that maximises expected prots (12) :
E () = 12M
nR ex+
=ex  q (; p) (p  cf ) d + RM=ex+ (p  cf ) d+
+
R b
=ex  q (; p)2 (ca; q) d + R ex+=b q (; p)2 (ca) d+
+
RM
=ex+ 2 (ca) d
o
:
(12)
The rst two integrals in (12) are the rst period prots. The last three
integrals capture the internalised e¤ects on the second period prots. A low
unit price facilitates coordination between consumers, but it erodes the rst
period prots. Proposition 10 presents the optimal tari¤ structure.
Proposition 10 When the true state is ; the optimal tari¤ structure is
t = max

1
2
(1 + ca) ; 1  q ()

p =
1
2
(M + cf )  1
2
 (ca)  1
8
(1  ca)2 : (13)
Proof. In the appendix.
The optimal prices are increasing in the usage cost,
dp
dca
=
1
16
(1  ca)

1
4
(1  ca)2 + 3

 0;
and
dt
dca
=
(
1
2 ; q (
)  12 (1  ca)
1 ca
4
h
5
8   132 (1  ca)2
i
; q () < 12 (1  ca)
which is positive for 0  ca < 1; and zero if the rm is at the corner solution
and ca = 1: The optimal unit price is increasing in production costs,
@p
@cf
> 0:
The usage fee is independent of production cost, as long as the rm is not
constrained when setting t: If the realised demand binds the optimal usage
fee, then the usage fee increases in production costs @t

@cf
= 14 > 0:
5.1 Role of uncertainty on prots and consumer surplus
Demand increases (decreases) in the precision of signals only if the state 
is higher (lower) than the marginal signal. Why? When the precision of the
signal is high, it tells the consumer that other people observe signals very
close to the one he has observed. If the realisation of  is below the marginal
signal, and if signals are relatively accurate, then the consumer infers that
most people do not buy. So, if  < ex and we decrease the precision of
signals (d > 0), then a larger proportion of people may observe signals
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that are above the marginal signal. This increases demand directly, and
also indirectly as consumers infer that a larger proportion of people buy,
which yields higher network externalities. Opposing, if  > ex and signals
are relatively precise, a reduction in the precision of signals causes a larger
proportion of people drawing signals that fall below the marginal signal,
which reduces demand both directly and indirectly.
Lemma 11 A decrease in the precision of signals decreases (increases) de-
mand when the true  is above (below) the marginal signal, @q(;p)@
<
(>)0()
 >(<)p+  (ca) ; ex      ex+ :
Proof. Proof follows directly from equation (11).
The optimal unit price (13) is independent of uncertainty over signals,
because the prior and signals are uniformly distributed. Resulting demand
is linear, which renders rst period prots neutral with respect to : If the
rm reaches the interior solution t = 12 (1 + ca), also the usage fee is in-
dependent of uncertainty. However, if the rm is held at the corner so-
lution, the optimal usage fee depends on the precision of signals, and we
have @t

@

q(;p)< 1
2
(1 ca) =  
@q(;p)
@ ; and the constrained optimal usage fee
is higher than the interior solution. Because the rm is constrained with
low values of ; it is likely that @q(
;p)
@ > 0 holds. Then, if uncertainty
is increased, the rst period demand increases. This relaxes the capacity
constraint in the second period. Consequently, the rm decreases its usage
fee in order to increase its second period sales.
Because there is the possibility that the true demand is low and the rm
cannot charge the unconstrained optimal usage fee, expected second period
prots are not independent of the precision of signals. Subsequently, the
expected total prots are positively correlated with the precision of signals.
Proposition 12 Increase in the precision of signals increases rms prots
@E ( (p; t))
@
=  (1  ca)
4
192M
 0:
Proof. In the appendix.
If  is increased marginally, demand increases (decreases) in states that
are below (above) the marginal signal. The rms prots are zero for  <ex   . Therefore states above the marginal signal have a larger weight
in expected prots, and the negative e¤ect on demand is dominating. The
negative e¤ect on prots comes mainly from high states where the consumers
are condent on high sales, thus on high interaction utility, and where the
demand is decreasing (both directly and indirectly) in uncertainty. As a
result, the rm always benets from more accurate information about the
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/EÝSÞ
/O < 0
/EÝSÞ
/O > 0O
ca
Figure 2: The sign of @E(S)@ :
value of its good. Only if ca = 1, so that second period usage is prevented
by high costs, expected prots are independent of uncertainty.
Expected consumer surplus is
E (S) =
1
4M
(Z b(p)
=ex(p) 
Z +
x=ex(p)

x+
1
2
q (; p)3   p

dxd+ (14)
+
Z ex(p)+
=b(p)
Z +
x=ex(p)

x+
1
8
(1  ca)2 q (; p)  p

dxd+
+
Z M
=ex(p)+
Z +
x= 

x+
1
8
(1  ca)2   p

dxd
)
:
To see the e¤ect of a change in signalsprecision, we di¤erentiate (14)
with respect to : The sign of @E(S)@ depends only on ca and ; and we denote
the solution to @E(S)@ = 0 by  (ca) : We have plotted the curve  =  (ca) in
Figure (2). Above the curve, the derivative @E(S)@ is positive, and below it is
negative: Hence, the minimum for E (S) with respect to  is given by  (ca).
Proposition 13 A decrease in the signalsprecision (d > 0), induces:
(i) for relatively precise signals  <  (ca), a decrease in expected con-
sumer surplus.
(ii) for relatively imprecise signals  >  (ca), an increase in expected
consumer surplus.
Proof. Obtained straightforwardly by di¤erentiating consumer surplus (14)
with respect to :
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Unlike with prots, the absolute magnitude of  plays a role in whether
consumer surplus increases or decreases for marginal changes in the pre-
cision. When the signals are precise ( <  (ca)), the expected consumer
surplus decreases, if uncertainty is marginally increased. When signals are
less accurate ( >  (ca)), consumer surplus is positively a¤ected by a mar-
ginal increase in uncertainty. Expected surplus is a¤ected via two e¤ects.
For a given ; there is a change in the expected demand for the product.
There is also a change in the expectation of the intrinsic value .
The negative e¤ect on surplus is foremost associated with the very high
states  > ex+ , where expected consumer surplus unambiguously decreases
as  increases. This is the segment, where consumers are condent on high
sales and subsequent high usage utility. The negative e¤ect is stronger the
smaller  is, which shows up in that the total e¤ect turns negative in the
area  <  (ca). For lower values of ; there is a mixture of positive and
negative e¤ects which sum up to the result illustrated in Figure (2).
If the signals are precise ( <  (ca)), so that the consumers are relatively
homogeneous, a consumer benets from the knowledge that other people are
like him, and network externalities have important role in decision-making.
In this case, further information (d < 0) on that perceived network exter-
nalities, which give the same utility for everyone, are driving everybodys
decisions increases expected surplus. And if we reduce the precision of sig-
nals, the little extra uncertainty about the other people hurts. However,
when the precision of signals drops to a relatively low level ( >  (ca)),
higher uncertainty is of good. Why? Low precision is analogous to high het-
erogeneity between consumers. If signals are imprecise, the consumer knows
that there is a large variance in the perception of the true intrinsic value of
the product within the population, and knows that other people know that
everybody is equally uninformed. This reduces the expected value of inter-
action utility. The consumer then bases his buying decision on the intrinsic
value, rather than on the expected behaviour of other people. In this case,
the consumer benets from further knowledge (d > 0) about the fact that
he can base his decision on his private value.
6 Comparison
In this section, we discuss the di¤erences between perfect and incomplete
information. We consider only the perfect information case where network
externalities are su¢ ciently low to guarantee a unique equilibrium, and the
rm is not constrained in the second period. Equations (8) and (13) give the
optimal unit prices under perfect and incomplete information respectively.
The term  18 (1  ca)2 ; present in both price equations, is the e¤ect from
second period prots. The rm takes into account that a high rst period
price reduces second period prots. This e¤ect is eliminated, if we introduce
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perfect competition in the second period, so that the usage fee is t = ca. The
optimal rst period monopoly price under incomplete information, when the
second period is characterised by perfect competition, is
pC =
1
2
M +
1
2
cf   1
2
C (ca) ;
where C (ca)  0: Derivation of pC is in the appendix.
Prices (8) and (13) diverge in two respects. First, because the rm
must take expectations on the distributions, the price tends to be higher
under incomplete information, as M replaces  +  in the price function.
Under incomplete information, the unit price is independent of heterogeneity
, which is in contrast to the perfect information case, in which the rm
increases the price for a marginal increase in heterogeneity.
The second di¤erence is the term  12 (ca)  0; which captures the rms
accurate perception on what are consumersexpectations on the second pe-
riod usage utility under incomplete information. Because under perfect in-
formation, all players, including the rm, observe perfectly how much usage
utility consumers get in the second period, the rm neutralises the e¤ect by
incorporating the usage utility fully in the unit price. Consumersexpecta-
tions are "xed" under incomplete information, so there is a potential gap
between expected and actual usage utility. This gap induces a bias: the rm
prices high in the rst period, before consumers learn the true state, at the
expense of uncertain second period prots. Thus, when the rm is uncer-
tain about second period sales, it adjusts the unit price upwards compared
to the perfect information price. This e¤ect is aggravated, when the second
period is characterised by perfect competition. We have C (ca)   (ca)
indicating that the monopoly does not have any incentives to insure second
period prots by setting a low rst period price. Demand, however, is higher
for the (second period) competition case than for the two-period monopoly,
q (pC) > q (p
), because the monopoly limits supply in the second period.
The following remark summarises the di¤erences between unit prices.
Remark 14 The unit price tends to be higher under incomplete information
than under perfect information. The unit price with second period perfect
competition is higher than the two-period monopoly unit price under incom-
plete information.
We cannot tell unambiguously whether demand is higher under perfect
or incomplete information. The numerical simulations we have carried out
tend to result in higher demand under perfect information.
The term determining real heterogeneity between consumers, ; has an
important coordination role for a unique equilibrium under perfect infor-
mation. This role is taken away if consumersvaluations are private infor-
mation. Even the smallest amount of uncertainty is su¢ cient to result in
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a unique equilibrium, whereas we had an explicit rule for minimum hetero-
geneity under perfect information.
The rms preferences over heterogeneity can di¤er under perfect and
incomplete information. Assume high network externalities and perfect in-
formation. If the market sentiment is pessimistic, so that coordination is
biased against the Pareto-e¢ cient NE, the rm may prefer higher hetero-
geneity between consumers, which would support a larger unique equilib-
rium. If we maintain high network externalities, but impose incomplete
information, coordination is una¤ected by the real heterogeneity between
consumers. Moreover, we know that the rms prots increase as the preci-
sion of signals increases. So, it prefers little heterogeneity.
7 Concluding remarks
We have analysed a market for network goods. A monopolist launches a de-
vice that enables e¢ cient interaction between people. The consumers face a
coordination problem in whether to switch to using the new device or to stick
with the prevailing interaction systems. This kind of coordination game has
multiple Nash equilibria under perfect information and homogenous con-
sumers. We have carried out a comprehensive analysis on the conditions for
equilibrium uniqueness. The benet of uniqueness is that the subsequent
comparative statics are determinate, and do not depend on argumentation
on the likelihood of out-of-model factors. Uniqueness of equilibrium, under
perfect information, requires high real consumer heterogeneity. Adversely,
this means that we must limit the role of network externalities in consumers
decision making. Under incomplete information, uniqueness does not hinge
on the real heterogeneity. Instead, we need to raise a possibility that the
fundamental value of the product can be very low or very high. As a result,
the set of buying decision criteria is less restricted, and the decisions can be
driven by network-intense attributes.
The results from perfect information case di¤er from the results from
the incomplete information case. The unit price is independent of con-
sumer heterogeneity under incomplete information, but it is increasing in
heterogeneity under perfect information. We showed that under incomplete
information, the monopolist biases its tari¤ structure in favour of the unit
price, at the expense of lower usage demand in the second period. Under
perfect information, such bias did not exist as the monopolist is able to per-
fectly incorporate second period usage utility in its rst period price. The
unit price therefore tends to be lower under perfect information.
A marginal change in consumer heterogeneity has an ambiguous e¤ect
on prots and consumer surplus under perfect information. Under incom-
plete information, the expected prots increase as the precision of signals
improves (i.e. heterogeneity between consumers is reduced). The e¤ect on
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expected consumer surplus depends on the absolute level of signal precision.
Consumer surplus increases, if the marginal change in the precision is in-line
with the way consumers make their buying decisions. If signals are precise
(imprecise), further improvement (reduction) in accuracy raises surplus. In
this sense, better agreement on the factor that drives decision making among
the consumers is of good, not the precision of signals as such.
In the model, the consumers had to invest up-front to the device in order
to benet from it in the usage stage, while the monopolist was not able to
commit to prices in the rst period, and it set the usage fee after consumers
had made their buying decisions. The separation of stages invites further
research. First, the case with credible commitment to prices in the rst
period could potentially result in a di¤erent balance between the unit price
and the usage fee. Secondly, the monopolist could be allowed to sell the
device in the second period to those who opted for not buying in the rst
period. This option might cause some consumers to wait in the rst period.
The incomplete information case o¤ers a number of interesting exten-
sions. We have used fairly specic distributions and utility functions that
could be generalised. The simplicity of the NE in the coordination game also
allows analysis on strategic investments that has been previously made dif-
cult by the multiplicity problem. We have assumed that consumers know
their needs better than the rm. It would be interesting to allow the rm
to observe something more than nothing. It could then use prices to ma-
nipulate consumersperceptions of the value of the good. This modication
would give information on when the rm has incentives to reveal information
about its goods, and how this improvement in the precision of the public
signal a¤ects consumer surplus.
Perfect information is a strong condition. For ordinary consumable
goods, this condition is not (necessarily) problematic, but in problems of
coordination, even a marginal di¤erence between perfect and almost per-
fect information can produce strikingly di¤erent outcomes (see also Morris
2002). Under perfect information, the coordination failure is a possible sce-
nario. If the main selling argument is based on networking benets, the
perfect information variant is in trouble in explaining which equilibrium is
the most probable one. Under incomplete information, there is no coordi-
nation failure. For a novel, technologically advanced, product, incomplete
information regime characterises the real world more accurately. Just think
about how we are more capable of saying how much utility a fax machine
or e-mail yields to other people today than, say, twenty years ago. As the
product matures, information becomes more accessible. Thus, coordination
failure seems to be less of a problem, compared to what the earlier network
externalities literature has proposed.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. We establish in (A i) - (A iv) that the unit price
is bounded, and any price in the feasible range induces multiple equilibria
in the coordination game   when network externalities are high. In (B
v) - (B vi), we establish that under low network externalities, endogenous
pricing can induce multiple equilibria, if the unit price lies below p=   
 + 18 (1  ca)2 : In (B vii), we prove that the unit price never exceeds the
highest types intrinsic valuation under low network externalities, and that
a price p 2 p;  +  induces a unique equilibrium in  : For parts (A i) - (A
iv),  < 116 (1  ca)2 holds. For parts (B v) - (B vii),  > 116 (1  ca)2 holds.
(A i) Due to the continuity of the payo¤ (3) and the fact that it is
increasing in x and q; there is a lower limit price p    for which the lowest
type has always a (weakly) dominant strategy to buy v

   ; q; p

 0 for
all q 2 [0; 1] : A price p  p induces a unique all buy equilibrium, but
the monopolist never decreases the price below p as that neither increases
demand nor induces a di¤erent outcome in  :
(A ii) For a price p 2
i
p;  + 
i
, q = 1 is an equilibrium, because the
lowest type gets v (   ; q = 1; p) > 0 due to high network externalities. If
consumers expect qe < 1, the lowest type does not buy, because the price
exceeds p dened in part (A i), thus v (   ; q; p) < 0. At the same time, the
highest type has a dominant strategy to buy v ( + ; q; p)  0; and therefore
there exists an equilibrium with q 2 ]0; 1[.
(A iii) For a price p 2  + ; p ; where p =     + 18 (1  ca)2 ; the
lowest type gets v (   ; q = 1; p) > 0; and q = 1 is an equilibrium, due to
continuity of the payo¤ (3) and the fact that it is increasing in x and q. If
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all consumers expect that no-one buys, then the highest type gets negative
utility v ( + ; q = 0; p) < 0, and no-one will buy in equilibrium. Hence, for
price p 2  + ; p there exist at least two equilibria q = 0 and q = 1:
(A iv) When the rm expects that coordination reaches the maxi-
mal equilibrium, we have a minimum price that the rm will ever charge
p =    + 18 (1  ca)2 ; which corresponds to the price that leaves the low-
est type indi¤erent between actions when everybody else buys. Because
the payo¤ (3) is continuous and increasing in x and q; there is an upper
boundary price p =  + +  (q)  p, above which it becomes a dominant
strategy for everyone not to buy. For a price p 2 p; p, no-one will buy if
consumers expect that no-one will buy, because even the highest type gets
negative utility v ( + ; q = 0; p) < 0. If consumers expect the maximal
equilibrium, we have a non-zero equilibrium. Hence, any price p 2 p; p
supports simultaneously two equilibria q = 0 and q 2 ]0; 1[.
(B v) Part (A i) applies under low network externalities as well.
(B vi) Assume that p 2
h
p; p
i
; where p =  + 18 (1  ca)2 : The highest
type has a strictly dominant strategy to buy due to the assumption on low
network externalities, so the case q = 0 is ruled out as an equilibrium. The
demand must satisfy
q = 1  x (q; p)   + 
2
;
where x (q; p) = p    (q) : In order to check if there exists a consistent
equilibrium with q < 1; plug the upper limit p in the above equation because
the demand is decreasing in p: We obtain
q = 1 
1
8 (1  ca)2    (q)
2
:
If the rm is unconstrained in the second period, the demand can be written
as
2 (1  q)

  1
16
(1  ca)2

= 0;
which holds only if q = 1: Thus there is no equilibrium with q 2 12 (1  ca) ; 1
and p < p:
If the rm is constrained in the second period, we write the demand as
q = 1 
1
8 (1  ca)2   12q3
2
:
The above equation has two solutions which satisfy q 2 0; 12 (1  ca) ; when
the heterogeneity parameter  is close to its minimum value 116 (1  ca)2 : As
a result, there can be multiple equilibria with p 2
h
p; p
i
under low network
externalities. In particular, the equilibria include qe = q = 1 and qe = q < 1;
but qe = 0 is ruled out.
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(B vii) Next we prove that the optimal price does not exceed the highest
types valuation, p   + ; and that the equilibrium is unique for any
price p 2 p;  +  ; where p =     + 18 (1  ca)2 ; under low network
externalities. Start by assuming q (p)  12 (1  ca) : In this case, the demand
corresponding to fullled expectations is given by
q (p) =
(
+ p
2[  116 (1 ca)2]
; if p  p   +   (1  ca)
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i
1; if p < p
We have @q(p)@p  0, so the highest feasible price is obtained with q =
1
2 (1  ca) : This price is p =  +   (1  ca)
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i
  +  with
equality at ca = 1.
Assume next that q (p) < 12 (1  ca). It is more convenient to solve for
the inverse demand function
p (q) =  +   q

2  1
2
q2

; (15)
which can be increasing in q 2 0; 12 (1  ca) : The rm maximises prots
by choosing q 2 0; 12 (1  ca). Since we are interested in the possibility of
the case p (q) >  + ; the term in parenthesis in (15) should be negative.
So, we require that  < 14q
2 holds. As we combine this condition with the
initial assumption on low network externalities, we obtain a range within
the heterogeneity parameter must strictly be 116 (1  ca)2 <  < 14q2: This
condition is the least binding when q is at its maximum. The assumption
q < 12 (1  ca) gives the maximal consistent level. Once this level is plugged
into the condition, we end up with 116 (1  ca)2 <  < 116 (1  ca)2 ; which
cannot hold. If we force  < 14q
2 to hold, we violate 116 (1  ca)2 < ; and vice
versa. Consequently, the term in the parenthesis in (15) is always positive,
hence the price remains bounded from above p (q)   + : Note that the
price is continuous in q 2 [0; 1] : If we plug q = 12 (1  ca) in (15) ; we get
p =  +   (1  ca)
h
  116 (1  ca)2
i
:
For price p 2 p;  +  ; the lowest type gets zero payo¤ at maximum
v (   ; q; p)  0 8q 2 [0; 1] : (16)
At the same time, the highest type always gets at least zero payo¤
v ( + ; q; p)  0 8q 2 [0; 1] : (17)
Inequalities (16) and (17) establish (weak) dominance regions which together
with increasing di¤erences @v(x;q;p)@x > 0 guarantee equilibrium uniqueness in
 : At the boundaries p 2 p;  + 	 everybody may play the same action,
but indeterminacy is restricted to the marginal (the lowest or the highest)
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type only, and we can ignore them. As a result, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof of Condition 8. The lower and upper dominance regions must
coexist for all consumer expectations.
(i) Start with the conditions for the upper dominance region,
9 2 ] M;M [ so that v (x; q; p) > 0 for all q 2 [0; 1] and x  :
Assume that consumers are "optimistic" and expect qe = 1, thus they
expect second period usage utility  (qe) = 18 (1  ca)2 : The consumer
who observes x and has expectations qe = 1; gets expected payo¤ gain
v (x; q; p) = x+ 18 (1  ca)2  p: Because v (x; q; p) is strictly increasing in x;
we get the marginal type xqe=1 = p  18 (1  ca)2 ; who is indi¤erent between
buying and not buying, and the true demand schedule
q (p) =
8><>:
0; if xqe=1 >  + 
++ 1
8
(1 ca)2 p
2 ; if      xqe=1   + 
1; if xqe=1 <    :
(18)
Demand (18) corresponds to the most optimistic expectations, thus it sup-
ports the highest monopoly price. Dene the cut-o¤ state bqe=1 below which
the monopoly is constrained in the second period. The monopolys expected
prots with expectations qe = 1 are
E () =
1
2M
(Z bqe=1
xqe=1 
[q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)2] d+ (19)
+
Z xqe=1+
bqe=1 [q (p) (p  cf ) + q (p)

2 ] d +
+
Z M
xqe=1+
(p  cf + 2 ) d
)
The optimisation of (19) gives the price
pqe=1 =
1
2

M + cf   1
8
(1  ca)2

:
The second order conditions are satised, @
2E()
@p2
=   1M < 0: Given the price
pqe=1; the highest type must have a strictly dominant strategy to buy, even
if no-one else buys, M +   pqe=1 > 0; where we have used  (qe = 0) = 0;
which gives the following condition on the bandwidths of F () and G (x j )
M + 2 > cf   1
8
(1  ca)2 : (20)
(ii) A similar line of reasoning must apply to the lower dominance region,
9 2 ] M;M [ so that v (x; q; p) < 0 for all q 2 [0; 1] and x  :
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Now, we look for the optimal price corresponding to the most "pessimistic"
expectations qe = 0: This price is the lowest price the rm will ever set. We
skip the derivation of the true demand schedule corresponding to expecta-
tions qe = 0; and the calculation of the respective optimal price. The pro-
cedures are identical to those explained in part (i). Given the optimal price
pqe=0 =
1
2
h
M + cf   14 (1  ca)2
i
corresponding to the most pessimistic ex-
pectations, the lowest type must have a strictly dominant strategy not to
buy, even if everybody else buys,  M    + 18 (1  ca)2   pqe=0 < 0; where
we have applied  (qe = 1) = 18 (1  ca)2 : As a result, the following require-
ment for the distribution bandwidths is obtained
 M   2
3
 <
1
3

cf   1
2
(1  ca)2

: (21)
The requirements (20) and (21) are satised simultaneously, when we
expand the support of F () by increasing M su¢ ciently.
Proof of Proposition 10. The optimal usage fee t is derived in Section
3. To obtain the optimal unit price, write the expected prots (12) as
E () =
1
2M
nR ex+ex  q (; p) (p  cf ) d + RMex+ (p  cf ) d+
+
R bex  q (; p)2 [1  ca   q (; p)] d+
+
R ex+b 14 (1  ca)2 q (; p) d + RMex+ 14 (1  ca)2 do :
The maximisation of the above expression with respect to p gives
p =
1
2
(M + cf )  1
2
 (ca)  1
8
(1  ca)2 :
The second order condition for local maximum is satised @
2E()
@p2
=  2 < 0:
Because the rst period prots maximisation problem is unconstrained, p
gives the global maximum.
Proof of Proposition 12. Write the prot function with the optimal
price structure as
E [ (p; t)] =
1
2M
"Z ex(p)+
ex(p)  q (; p) (p   cf ) d+ (22)
+
Z M
ex(p)+ (p   cf ) d +
+
Z b(p)
ex(p)  q (; p)
2 [1  ca   q (; p)] d +
+
Z ex(p)+
b(p)
1
4
(1  ca)2 q (; p) d +
Z M
ex(p)+
1
4
(1  ca)2 d
#
:
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To see the e¤ect of an increase in the precision of signals, di¤erentiate
(22) with respect to : By applying the envelope theorem, the reported result
is obtained
@E [ (p; t)]
@
=  (1  ca)
4
192M
< 0:
Vertical separation: perfect competition in the second period.
The introduction of competition in the second period does not change
the solution process, and the coordination game still satises global game
conditions. In the second period, the usage fee is t = ca; which gives the
indirect usage utility
 (q) =

1
2 (1  ca)2 q; q  1  ca
q
 
q   12q2   caq

; q < 1  ca :
In calculating the marginal type, we need to take into account the cut-o¤
point q = 1   ca: The marginal type is ex = p + C (ca) ; where C (ca) =
1
24 (1  ca)2
h
(1  ca)2   6
i
 0:
The rm does not take into account whether consumers are constrained
in the second period or not, and it maximises expected prots
E [1 (p)] =
p  cf
M
(M   p  C (ca)) :
The optimal monopoly price equals
pC =
1
2
(M + cf   C (ca)) :
The second order conditions are satised, @
2E(1(p))
@p2
=   1M < 0: If we plug
the optimal price back to the demand function, we get
q (pC) =
 +   12M   12cf   12C (ca)
2
;
where  is the realisation of the state. If we compare q (pC) with the
monopoly demand of the main model
q (p) =
 +   12M   12cf   12 (ca) + 18 (1  ca)2
2
;
we see that demand is higher with competition, because the monopoly re-
stricts demand in the second period, which reduces usage utility.
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